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Abstract 
 
The effects of debt on firms’ performance have drawn much attention from researchers in 
that it is a crucial issue for managers. It is essential to understand debt and its relationship 
with firm’s performance so managers can assess financial needs, borrowing capacity and the 
ability to have profits and maximize performance. The relationship between debt and a 
firm’s performance has been studied from different perspectives. However, empirical studies 
have shown ambiguous results. In this way, this work aims at contributing to the extant 
literature, by focusing on the influence of the institutional framework on the relationship 
between debt and performance. It is a poorly studied factor since most studies focus only on 
the relationship between debt and firms’ performance in one country.  Therefore, this study 
has the purpose of filling a research gap bringing new empirical evidence to this matter, 
based on a large sample of 48,840 manufacturing firms from nine European countries for the 
2008-2013 period and using multivariable methods. Results show that the impact of debt on 
a firm’s performance depends on the measure of debt (short term debt positively affects a 
firm’s performance while long term debt presents a negative relationship) and that the 
institutional framework is indeed affecting the relationship between debt and firm’s 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The effects of debt on firms’ performance are a relevant theme to managers for a 
long time. As referred by Weill (2008), the relationship between debt and firm 
performance has been studied from different theoretical perspectives, from 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) to the agency cost theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977), the trade-off theory (Scott, 1977) and the pecking order theory (Myers 
and Majlufís, 1984). 
As stated by Weill (2008, p.253) “theoretical literature provides opposing 
arguments with respect to the relationship between leverage and corporate 
performance”. Furthermore there are a vast number of studies relating financial 
leverage and a firm’s performance also with ambiguous results (Yazdanfar and 
Ohmar, 2015). For instance, while Zeitun and Saleh (2015), studying 400 firms from 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) over the 2004-2012 period, 
concluded that debt negatively affects firm performance, Abor (2005) testing the 
relationship among 22 listed firms in the Ghana stock exchange market over the 
1998-2002 period obtained the opposite results suggesting that short-term debt 
positively influences firm profitability. Weill (2008), focusing his study on firms 
from seven European countries over the 1998-2000 period also obtained divergent 
results: the author found a positive relationship for Belgium, France, Germany and 
Norway, a negative relationship for Italy and Spain, and not statistically significant 
for Portugal. 
Weill (2008) reports that empirical studies usually focus only on one country and 
suggests that the different results evidenced in the empirical literature may derive 
from the fact that the institutional framework may have an effect on the relationship. 
Weill (2008) studied this question by dividing the institutional framework into two 
major institutional factors: “the access to bank credit for firms” and “the attributes of 
the legal system”. Weill’s findings show that the divergent results from country to 
country are influenced by the two institutional factors referred. However, as it was 
stated by the author, more research is needed with more data including a larger 
number of countries and over a longer period of time. In this way, the aim of this 
work is to contribute to the extant literature with the main objective of clarifying the 
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relationship between debt and firm’s performance. More specifically, the present 
work aims to answer the following research question: 
Does the institutional framework affect the relationship between debt and a firm’s 
performance? 
This study has the purpose of filling a research gap created by ambiguous results 
but it is also relevant for companies and entrepreneurs, since as highlighted by Zeitun 
and Saleh (2015) a better understanding on debt and its relationship with firm’s 
performance can assist them assessing financial needs, borrowing capacity and 
consequent ability to achieve profits and maximize performance. Actually firms’ 
managers who are able to plan their debt policy are more likely than other managers 
to reduce the firm’s cost of capital increasing profitability thereby improving its 
performance (Yazdanfar and Ohman, 2015). 
In order to answer the research question we will focus on a sample of firms from 
nine European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden) over the 2008-2013 period. In this way this study will 
cover more countries and a longer period of time when compared to Weill (2008), 
trying to add new empirical evidence to this matter.  
After this section, this report is structured as follows: in Section 2, a literature 
review of the topic is presented, which includes the relevant definitions for the theme 
(Section 2.1), the main theories that explain the relationship between debt and firm 
performance (Section 2.2), a survey of empirical studies about this relationship 
(Section 2.3), and finally, a critical analyses of the literature reviewed (Section 2.4). 
Section 3 presents the methodology, which includes the phases of the study (Section 
3.1), model specification (Section 3.2), data sources and characterization of the 
sample (Section 3.3) and a descriptive analysis of the variables (Section 3.4). Section 
4 presents the empirical results of the present study which includes a correlation 
analysis (Section 4.1), the model estimation and analysis by country (Section 4.2) 
and the role of institutional factors (Section 4.3). Finally Section 5 presents the main 
conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future studies. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter discusses relevant definitions and studies for the theme. Section 2.1 
presents the relevant concepts of performance and debt followed by section 2.2 
presenting relevant theories justifying optimal capital structures (e.g. Modigliani and 
Miller, Agency Theory, Trade-off Theory and Pecking-order theory). Finally, section 
2.3 focuses on reviewing a number of empirical studies on the influence of debt on 
firm performance followed by section 2.4 which presents a critical analysis of the 
literature reviewed.  
 
2.1 Concepts 
 
2.1.1. Firm performance 
According to Chakravarthy (1986), as cited in Santos and Brito (2012, p.100), 
“financial performance is a way to satisfy investors” and can be represented by more 
than one indicator. Usually financial performance measures are divided into three 
major indicators categories: profitability, growth and market value, as shown in 
Table 1. Table 1 also presents the most used measures of each category. 
 
Table 1: Categories of performance measures 
Profitability Growth Market value 
Return on Assets Sales Growth Stock price improvement 
Return on Sales Asset Growth Dividend yield 
Return on Investment Net revenue growth Stock price volatility 
EBITDA Margin Net income growth Market value added 
Return on Equity  Tobin’s Q 
Economic Value added  Market-to-book value 
Earnings per share   
Source: Own elaboration based on Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986), Cho 
and Pucik (2005), and Al-Matari, Al-Swidi and Fadzil (2014) 
 
According to Cho and Pucik (2005) and Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986), 
profitability is the past firm ability to generate returns and can be measured through 
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several ratios directly related to the company’s accounting: return on assets (ROA), 
expressed by the ratio of net income over total assets; return on sales (ROS) or profit 
margin, corresponding to the ratio of net income over sales; EBITDA margin 
calculated by dividing firm’s earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) by its revenues; return on investment (ROI), defined by the 
ratio between the gains from investment minus the cost of investment over cost of 
investment; return on equity (ROE), defined by the ratio of Net income over 
shareholder's equity; economic value added (EVA) calculated by subtracting the cost 
of capital to the net operating profit after taxes. Finally, as a last indicator, earnings 
per share (EPS) obtained by the ratio of net income minus dividends on preferred 
stock over average outstanding shares (Cho and Pucik, 2005; Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1986). 
Growth is the past firm ability to increase its size and can be assessed by several 
indicators in order to study the firm temporal performance from on year to another 
with respect to several variables, such as sales, assets, net revenue, net income (Cho 
and Pucik, 2005; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986).  
Market value represents the expected value by the market considering the future 
performance of the firm and bringing a future temporal perspective to performance 
(Cho and Pucik, 2005; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). The presented 
measures are stock price improvement, dividend yield (ratio of annual dividends per 
share over price per share), stock price volatility, market value added (MVA) 
(company’s market value minus invested capital), Tobin’s Q (obtained by the ratio of 
total market value over total asset value) and market-to-book value (MTBV), 
calculated by dividing the market capitalization by the total market value (Cho and 
Pucik, 2005; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). 
Accounting measures, such as ROA, ROE, ROI, among others, have the 
disadvantage of looking to the past, being better suited as short-term performance 
measures and are often limited by accounting standards, while market-based 
measures (Tobin-Q, Market Value Added, Market-to-Book Value, among others) 
look to the future, giving information for long term-performance (Al-Matari et al., 
2014).  
Despite the disadvantages of accounting based performance measures these are 
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easier to get and are more frequently used, as suggested by Al-Matari et al. (2014) 
who identified the most used performance measures in 286 empirical studies 
published between 2003 and 2012. According to this study, accounting based 
performance measures were used in 191 studies and the most used measures were: 
ROA (88 studies), ROE (52 studies), EBITDA margin (15 studies), ROS (9 studies) 
and earnings per share (EPS) (9 studies). Furthermore, market-based performance 
measures were used in 95 studies: Tobin-Q was used in the majority of the studies 
(74 studies) while the second most used measure was market to book value (MTBV) 
(6 studies). Note that this study refers sales growth as the only growth measure which 
was used only in 3 studies. 
 
2.1.2. Debt 
The second relevant definition is debt as a component of the capital structure. 
According to Abor (2005), capital structure is a mix of different securities but mostly 
the capital structure is divided in internal financing (equity, retained earnings, among 
others) and external financing (Debt). This second component of the capital structure 
is the most relevant here since the objective of this work is to study the relationship 
between debt and firm performance.  
Previous literature suggests that the legal and financial environment of a country 
influences the access to external financing (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998). This means that in countries with weak legal and financial systems 
firms have more difficulty in obtaining external financing, which results in fewer 
opportunities to invest and consequently affects a firm’s performance (La Porta et al.,  
1998). 
Debt can be divided into three types according to Abor (2007): short term debt, 
long term debt and trade credit. Usually debt it is measured with different indicators 
based on ratios of debt in order to compare debt to the size of the company, such as 
debt/equity or debt/assets, and each one of these indicators can resort to different 
types of debt (e.g. short term debt/Equity, long term debt/equity, etc.).  
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2.2 The relationship between debt and firm performance: theoretical analysis 
 
2.2.1. Capital structure theories  
 
According to Weill (2008) the relationship between debt and firm performance 
can be explained using the perspective of Modigliani and Miller, the agency theory, 
the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. Table 2 presents a summary of the 
different theories. 
Table 2: Theoretical approaches 
Theory/Author 
 
Impact of debt on firm 
Performance 
Mechanism 
Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) 
Irrelevant - 
Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) 
Positive Tax saving benefits due to debt 
interests 
Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers 
(1977) 
Negative Conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders 
Positive Conflicts between shareholders and 
managers 
Trade-off Theory 
Scott (1977); Miller 
(1977) 
Positive effect until optimal 
value, negative effect afterwards 
Tax benefits vs cost of financial 
distress 
Pecking-order theory 
Myers and Majluf 
(1984) 
Negative 
 
Internal financing as the preferred 
method, followed by debt and external 
equity financing  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
To start this analysis is important to refer the perspective of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) as the first theory on capital structure stating that in a perfect capital 
market the capital structure has no effect on firm value. This theory is based on some 
unrealistic assumptions that makes it not applicable in the real world, namely that no 
taxes or transaction costs exist, all investors have similar opportunities in the 
financial markets with similar costs, there is no information asymmetry, no 
bankruptcy costs and no effect of debt on company's earnings (El-Chaarani, 2015). 
As Modigliani and Miller (1958) refer this was a “static, partial equilibrium 
analysis”.  
Giving a different perspective Modigliani and Miller (1963) improved their 
previous study by considering the effect of tax savings directly related to debt 
financing. The results suggest a positive correlation between leverage and a firm’s 
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performance due to the positive effects of tax savings since interest payments will be 
deducted to the EBITDA lowering the amount of taxable results. 
The agency theory, developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) 
advocates that conflicts between shareholders and debtholders in companies with 
higher leverage levels generate higher agency costs which lower firm’s performance. 
These conflicts come from the fact that shareholders have incentives to invest in 
riskier projects since possible losses are shared between debtholders and 
shareholders. In this way, this theory supports the negative effects of debt on a firm’s 
performance. This theory is assumed to be applicable to both large and small 
businesses (Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson, 1996; Myers 2001) and it is assumed 
that firms with an higher level of equity capital, have lower agency costs related with 
conflicts between shareholders and debtholders increasing its performance (Casey 
and Anderson, 1997; Ooi, 2000). Also owners of firms with higher levels of debt risk 
losing their property and losing control over their firms (Holmes and Kent, 1991; 
Hamilton and Fox, 1998). According to Fama and French (2002), excessive levels of 
debt lead to higher agency costs, which imply a negative relation between the debt 
ratio and a firm’s performance. All these authors defend lower levels of debt in order 
to maximize performance. 
Agency theory also has a different perspective supporting positive effects of 
debt on firm performance coming from the conflicts between shareholders and 
managers (Weill, 2008). This type of conflicts is due to the “moral hazard” problem 
from managers who have their own objectives that may not be the best for the value 
of the firm (Weill, 2008; El-Chaarani, 2015). In this conflict debt financing is a 
solution by putting a burden on managers’ actions through interest payment 
obligations and consequent free cash flow reduction, which limits the freedom to use 
company’s cash-flow. In this way debt generates pressure on managers by limiting 
their actions and pressuring them to perform well and to generate cash flow in order 
to pay the debt service. As a result firm’s performance increases as well as the firm’s 
value (Jensen, 1986; El-Chaarani, 2015).  
The trade-off theory is another theory justifying a positive association between 
debt and a firm’s performance by comparing tax benefits of debt and bankruptcy 
costs. As debt increases, the marginal benefit resulting from further increases in debt 
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decreases and the marginal cost increases (Scott, 1977). In conclusion this theory 
defends a positive relationship between debt and firm performance until the 
equilibrium point where the cost of financial distress equals the benefits of tax 
savings. In this way if a company wants to optimize its value it should focus on this 
trade-off between the cost of financial distress and the benefits of tax savings when 
choosing between the amount of debt and equity to use and will not go further than 
this equilibrium point since further increases in debt will reduce firm value (Scott, 
1977; Miller, 1977).  
As a last theory on Capital structure the pecking order theory presented by 
Myers and Majluf (1984) does not justify a positive or negative relationship between 
debt and firm performance but, instead, focuses on asymmetrical information costs to 
justify companies options between internal and external financing. Managers know 
more about their firms than investors which make companies prioritize their 
financing strategy based on the cost of financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This 
mechanism leads companies to use internal financing as the preferred method since it 
is the less costly method, followed by debt, signalling confidence that an investment 
is profitable, and external equity financing as a last resort (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
For these authors there is a “pecking order” as a hierarchy in firm financing and not a 
balanced approach as the result of the trade-off theory presented before. Following 
the previous argument is possible to say that internal financing is less costly than 
debt financing which might indicate a negative correlation between debt and a firm’s 
performance, mostly in investments that turn to be less profitable than expected and 
presenting lower rates of return when compared with the cost of financing (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Abor, 2005).  
After the presentation of the relevant theories on the effects of debt on a firm’s 
performance it is important to state that these theories are based on assumptions 
which are difficult to verify in reality. With this in mind and following Weill’s 
(2008) approach it is important to study the institutional framework of each country 
as a possible moderating factor in the relationship between debt and a firm’s 
performance. This factor will allow the introduction of individual characteristics of 
each country on the analysis and in that way try to explain the divergent results 
presented by the theory. 
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2.2.2. The Institutional Framework 
 
A last point in focus is the institutional framework, as the set of laws, 
regulations, procedures, and norms affecting socioeconomic activity (Weill, 2008) 
and more specifically the institutional factors affecting the relationship between debt 
and a firm’s performance. According to Weill (2008) we have two main factors, as 
reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Institutional factors 
Institutional factors Measures 
“Access to bank credit” for firms The ratio of “claims of deposit banks on private 
sector GDP” 
Attributes of the legal system Protection of creditor rights index 
Protection of shareholders rights index 
“Efficiency of the legal system” index 
Source: Own elaboration, based on Weill (2008) 
 
The first factor is the “access to bank credit” for firms, since according to 
Corbett and Jenkinson (1994), as cited in Weill (2008), European small and medium 
size enterprises (SMEs) rely on debt financing to keep operating. This first factor 
was defined by Weill “as the ratio of claims of deposit banks on private sector GDP” 
and according to the author it can influence the relationship between debt and a 
firm’s performance through “the signaling argument”. According to this argument, 
companies issue debt in order to give signs to the market showing that they can 
support interest payments. In this way, the conclusion is that in countries where the 
“access to bank credit” for firms is lower the signaling argument will also pay a 
minor role (Weill, 2008). 
The second factor to consider is the attributes of the legal system which are 
divided into three main indexes provided by La Porta et al. (1998), as cited in Weill 
(2008): first an index to measure the “protection of creditor rights”; second the 
protection of shareholder rights (these two indexes are the norm to assess investor 
protection); and as the last index is the “rule of law” dealing with “efficiency of the 
legal system to assess the enforcement of the rights”. This last index is supplied by 
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private credit risk agencies (Weill, 2008). The main argument used by Weill (2008) 
is that changes in rights, both to shareholders and creditors, affect two of the 
arguments about the relationship between debt and performance. On the one hand, if 
shareholders’ rights increase it enhances their power against managers and the role of 
the “free-cash flow argument” decreases. On the other hand, if creditor’s rights 
increase it will “help to reduce moral hazard problems” of shareholders taking 
riskier investments. These two factors are directly affecting the Agency theory 
mechanisms justifying their use in the analysis. Finally, and according to Weill 
(2008), if the third index (“efficiency of the legal system”) is improved “the 
protection of creditor and shareholder rights” is improved and consequently both the 
“free cash flow argument” (positive impact on performance) and “moral hazard 
problems” (negative impact on performance) mechanisms are affected, as mentioned 
above. Nevertheless it is assumed that the greater impact of the third index is the 
reduction of moral hazard problems through increase in creditor’s rights since most 
countries in this analysis are bank-oriented financial systems (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2000).  
Gonzalez (2013) also focus on the institutional framework by dividing countries 
in 4 groups with similar institutional characteristics, namely “English origin, French 
origin, German origin, and Scandinavian origin countries”. Results showed that the 
impact of leverage on a firm’s performance is affected by the legal origin of each 
country. This conclusion was directly related with French legal origin countries 
where financial distress costs outweigh the benefits of the disciplinary role of debt. 
This analysis of Gonzalez (2013) uses the “protection of shareholder rights and the 
strength of legal enforcement” as the main variables explaining the institutional 
framework and the effects on the relationship between debt and a firm’s performance 
through its effects on agency conflicts following a similar approach to Weill (2008). 
The analysis of Weill (2008) and Gonzalez (2013) suggest that the institutional 
framework of each country can have a significant impact on the theoretical 
arguments and in the divergent results from previous empirical studies. In this way, it 
is essential to continue the research on the relationship between debt and a firm’s 
performance focusing on the impact of the institutional framework in order to deepen 
this issue. 
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2.3.Empirical studies on the effect of debt on firm performance 
 
Several empirical studies have been studying the impact of debt on a firm’s 
performance. Table 4 summarizes fourteen studies chronologically ordered, focusing 
on the country analysed, sample, period, method, proxies for performance and debt 
and the main results. The present studies were selected through searching on Web of 
science and SCOPUS databases in January of 2016, using the key words “Leverage”, 
“Debt” or “Capital structure” and “Corporate performance”, “firm performance” or 
“firm profitability” in order to reach the most relevant studies. To complement this 
research and found studies related with European companies there were also used the 
terms “Europe” and “European firms”. This search allowed reaching ten studies:  
Abor (2005), Abor (2007), Weill (2008), Ebaid (2009), Salim and Yadav (2012), 
Gonzalez (2013), Yazdanfar and Ohmar (2015), Zeitun and Saleh (2015), El-
Chaarani (2015) and Tsuruta (2015). The remaining studies were selected by their 
references with attention to the date of publication in order to have the most recent 
references. 
 
Table 4: Summary of empirical studies on the effect of debt on firm’s performance 
 
Author 
(year) 
Country Sample 
(firms) 
Period Method Proxies for 
performance 
Proxies for debt Result 
Majumbar 
and 
Chhibber 
(1999) 
India 1,043 1988-
1994 
Weighted 
least 
squares 
estimation 
Profit/sales 
(%) 
Return on net 
worth  
Total debt to 
equity ratio 
 
- 
Simerly 
and Li 
(2000) 
US 700 1989-
1993 
Multiple 
regression 
model  
ROA 
ROI 
Total debt to 
equity ratio 
 
+/- 
Abor 
(2005) 
Ghana 22 1998-
2002 
Panel Data 
OLS 
ROE Short-term/ long-
term/total debt to 
total capital ratio 
 
+/- 
Abor 
(2007) 
Ghana; 
South 
Africa 
360 1998-
2003 
Panel Data 
GLS 
Gross profit 
margin 
ROE 
Tobin’s Q 
Short-term/ long-
term/total debt to 
total capital ratio  
 
+/- 
Weill 
(2008) 
Belgium; 
France; 
Germany; 
Norway; 
Italy;Spain; 
Portugal 
11,836 1998-
2000 
One-stage 
procedure; 
The cost 
efficiency 
model 
Frontier 
efficiency 
scores 
 
Total liabilities to 
total assets ratio 
 
+/-/0 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Ebaid 
(2009) 
Egypt 64 1997-
2005 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis; 
OLS 
ROE 
ROA 
Gross profit 
Margin 
Short-term/long-
term/total debt  to 
total assets ratio 
 
0/- 
Salim and 
Yadav 
(2012) 
Malaysia 237 1995-
2011 
OLS ROA 
ROE 
EPS 
Tobin’s Q 
Short term debt 
long term debt; 
total debt  
 
+/- 
Gonzalez 
(2013) 
39 countries 10,375 1995-
2004 
 GMM Ratio of 
EBITDA over 
Assets 
 
Book value of 
total debt to book 
value of total 
assets ratio 
 
+/- 
Olokoyo, 
(2013) 
Nigeria 101 2003-
2007 
Panel Data 
analysis 
ROA 
ROE  
Tobin’s Q 
Short-term/long-
term/total debt  to 
total assets ratio 
 
+/- 
Akem et al 
(2014) 
Nigeria 173 2002-
2012 
Descriptive, 
correlation 
and 
regression 
technique 
ROI 
ROA 
Total/long-term 
debt to equity 
ratio; 
Total debt 
 
- 
Yazdanfar 
and 
Ohmar 
(2015) 
Sweden 15,897 2009-
2012 
3SLS; 
fixed-
effects 
models  
ROA Short term/ long 
term debt to 
assets ratio 
 
- 
Zeitun and 
Saleh 
(2015) 
Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council 
countries 
400 2004-
2012 
Dynamic 
GMM 
ROA 
Tobin’s Q 
Total debt to total 
assets ratio 
 
- 
El-
Chaarani 
(2015) 
France; 
Italy; Spain; 
Germany; 
Austria; 
Switzerland 
UK; Ireland 
5,050 2012 Descriptive, 
correlation 
and 
regression 
technique 
Tobin’s Q Total debt to total 
assets ratio 
 
+/- 
Tsuruta 
(2015) 
Japan 90,036 1996-
2006 
Panel Data 
OLS 
 
Operating 
income to total 
assets ratio; 
growth rate of 
sales 
Short-term 
borrowings 
growth: trade 
payables growth; 
trade receivables; 
bill discount 
 
+ 
Legend: +/-/0 represent, respectively, a positive, negative or not statistically significant relationship; 
OLS – Ordinary least squares; GLS – Generalized least squares; GMM - Generalised Method of 
Moments; 3SLS – three stage least squares  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
As it is visible in table 4 results diverge when talking about the relationship 
between debt and a firm’s performance and there is no exact answer for the question 
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“Is the relationship between debt and firm performance positive or negative?”. Some 
of these studies have small samples and focus only on one country which might 
affect the results. Variables used in these studies can also justify these differences 
since, as explained before there are multiple ways to measure performance and debt.  
Performance is considered as the dependent variable and the most commonly 
measures are ROA, ROE and ROI which is consistent with the results of Al-Matari et 
al. (2014) mentioned in section 2.1.1. As the main independent variables in these 
studies debt proxies are used, usually related with ratios of debt (total, short term and 
long term) to capital or assets. Control variables are also used in order to assess the 
relationship between debt and a firm’s performance. Firm size measures are 
commonly used being present in most empirical studies reviewed, as well as growth 
and firm age. 
Majumdar and Chhibber (1999) investigated the relationship between debt 
and a firm’s performance based on a sample of 1,043 Indian firms from several 
industry sectors during the 1988-1994 period. The results revealed a negative 
relationship between the debt ratio and a firm’s performance measured by the profit 
over sales ratio and return on net worth. These authors suggested an important 
impact of the specific case of India financial institutions since those are state-owned 
which may take a significant impact on the relationship between debt and firm 
performance.  
Simerly and Li (2000) based their analysis on a sample of 700 large US firms 
from several industry sectors over the 1989-1993 period, examining the “joint effect 
of competitive environments and capital structure on economic performance.” 
(Simerly and Li, 2000, p.31). Results suggested that the impact of financial leverage 
can be positive in the case of a stable environment and negative in a dynamic 
business environment. This is justified by the fact that in dynamic business 
environments debt limits the strategic choice of managers. 
Abor (2005) tested the relationship among 22 listed firms in Ghana over the 
1998-2002 period having found a positive relationship between the short-term debt to 
total assets ratio and ROE but a negative impact of the long-term debt to total assets 
ratio on ROE was found. The results also showed a positive relationship between the 
total debt to total assets ratio and ROE, which may result from the greater effect of 
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short-term debt mentioned above. This study is characterized by a very small sample. 
Two years later Abor (2007) studied a sample of 160 Ghanaian and 200 South 
African SMEs over the 1998-2003 period. According to the results, short term debt is 
positively related to firms’ performance and long-term debt is negatively related to 
the firms’ performance like the results of his previous study. However, total debt 
presents a negative relationship with the firms’ performance thus obtaining opposite 
results to the previous study, which can be justified by a number of different factors, 
from the larger sample to the inclusion of another country. 
Weill (2008) analysed the effect of financial leverage on the performance of 
11,836 manufacturing firms operating in seven European countries over the 1998-
2000 period, which might be considered a small period of time. The results obtained 
by Weill (2008) indicate that the effect of debt on a firm's performance varies from 
country to country:  financial leverage has a positive effect on a firm’s performance 
in Spain and Italy, but is negatively related to a firm’s performance in Germany, 
France, Belgium and Norway; In the case of Portugal results obtained are not 
statistically significant. Weill (2008) added a different perspective to his work by 
considering the role of the institutional framework of each country. To explore this 
aspect Weill included two new factors in his analysis: the “access to bank credit” and 
the attributes of the legal system. The second factor was also divided into three 
indexes namely, protection of creditor rights, protection of shareholders rights, and 
“efficiency of the legal system”. Weill’s results showed indications in favour of the 
positive impact of access to bank credit in the relationship between debt and firm 
performance and a positive influence of the attributes of the legal system on the 
relationship between debt and firm performance. Results also suggested that the 
positive impact of the attributes of the legal system come from the positive influence 
of the “efficiency of the legal system” index, since both the protection of shareholder 
rights and the protection of creditor rights have no significant impact on the 
relationship between debt and a firm’s performance. 
Ebaid (2009) studied 64 Egyptian firms, which might be considered a small 
sample, on the 1997-2005 period. On the one hand, the empirical tests indicated that 
capital structure has a negative impact on the firm's ROA. On the other hand, 
considering other performance measures such as ROE or gross profit margin capital 
15  
structure has no significant impact on a firm's performance. In this way, the author 
concluded that the choice of capital structure has no significant impact on the 
financial performance of Egyptian firms listed in the stock exchange. 
Salim and Yadav (2012) studied 237 Malaysian listed firms on the Bursa 
Malaysia Stock exchange in the 1995-2011 period with results showing a negative 
relationship between short and long term debt and a firm’s performance measured by 
ROE and ROA, but a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q and no significant 
relationship with earning per share (EPS). This study confirms that accounting 
measures can lead to different results when compared to market measures, as stated 
by Al-Matari et al. (2014). 
With the aim of studying the effects of leverage on firm performance when 
the industry faces downturns, Gonzalez (2013) focused on a sample of 10,375 firms 
from 39 different countries in the 1995-2004 period. Countries were divided into four 
groups: the first group comprises the countries from English origin,1 the second 
group is composed by the countries from French origin,2 the third group of countries 
is from German origin,3 and finally the fourth group is composed of Scandinavian 
origin countries.4 Results showed that the impact of leverage on firm performance 
varies with the legal origin of each country. As stated by Gonzalez (2013, p.182) 
“The protection of shareholder rights and the system of legal enforcement are key 
variables for distinguishing when leverage has a negative or a positive effect on 
corporate operating performance when industries suffer an economic downturn. In 
countries with a high level of protection of shareholder rights and a strong system of 
legal enforcement there is a negative effect of leverage on corporate operating 
performance when industries experience poor performance”. Results showed that 
French civil law countries, characterized by lower levels of shareholder rights and a 
weaker system of legal enforcement, present a positive effect of leverage on 
performance in industry downturns, with a negative relationship in common law 
countries and no effects on Scandinavian and Germanic origin countries. This study 
                                                          
1Countries included are: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States. 
2 Countries included are: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. 
3 Countries included are: Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan. 
4 Countries included are: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
16  
can be compared to the one of Weill (2008) since the legal origin of the countries is 
assumed to influence the relationship between debt and performance: Gonzalez 
(2013) aggregated the countries in groups and Weill (2008) conducted an individual 
analysis. 
Olokoyo (2013) studied 101 Nigerian companies in the 2003-2007 period to 
determine the overall effect of capital structure on corporate performance. Results 
diverge with the performance measure used since the conclusion was that capital 
structure has positive influence on the market performance of Nigerian firms 
measured by Tobin’s Q but it has negative influence on their accounting performance 
measures (ROA and ROE). These results are similar to the ones of Salim and Yadav 
(2012) confirming, once again, the different results from the use of accounting and 
market measures. 
Akem et al. (2014) studied 173 companies listed on the Nigeria stock 
exchange in the 2002-2012 period with results showing a negative relationship 
between debt (measured by debt to equity ratio, long term debt to capital employed 
ratio, total debt) and firm performance (measured by ROI and ROA ). This study 
used descriptive, correlation and regression techniques. These results are similar to 
the ones of Olokoyo (2013) showing a negative effect of debt on a firm’s 
performance measured by accounting measures. 
Yazdanfar and Ohmar (2015) examined the relationship between debt ratio 
and performance among 15,897 small and medium sized enterprises in Sweden in the 
2009-2012 period. Results showed that debt negatively affects firm’s performance 
(measured by ROA). This study used three-stage least squares (3SLS) and fixed- 
effects models to estimate the model, which is not used very often, with the objective 
of avoiding any potential endogeneity between the dependent and independent 
variables. 
Zeitun and Saleh (2015) studied 400 firms from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries in the 2004-2012 period. Results indicated that leverage measured 
by total debt to total assets ratio is a negative and significant determinant of 
performance (measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q). These results are different from the 
ones of Salim and Yadav (2012) and Olokoyo (2013) since both of them reached 
opposite results for accounting and market performance measures. In addition, this 
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study also investigated the impact of the recent financial crisis on GCC firms with 
results showing a negative influence of this variable on firms’ performance.  
El-Chaarani (2015) studied 5,050 firms in the year of 2012 having obtained 
mixed results. Following the same methodology as Gonzalez (2013), countries were 
aggregated in three legal origins: first the French civil law countries with the worst 
legal protections composed by France and Italy; second, English common law 
countries characterized by the strongest protection for minor investors composed by 
United Kingdom and Ireland; and finally, German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries characterized by being in the middle in terms of protection and composed 
by Germany, Austria and Switzerland. This approach is similar to that of Gonzalez 
(2013) with the exception of German and Scandinavian civil law countries that were 
divided in the previous study. Using Tobin’s Q as a performance measure, results 
showed that debt was negatively related to the firm’s performance in French civil law 
countries; in common law countries a positive relationship was found; in the case of 
German and Scandinavian civil law countries the relationship obtained was not 
statistically significant . These results may link the relationship between debt and a 
firm’s performance to the institutional framework since the results show a positive 
relationship in the countries with the strongest protection and a negative relationship 
in French civil law countries characterized by the worst legal protections. However 
these results are opposite from those obtained by Gonzalez (2013). A common result 
in both studies is the insignificant results in German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries. These divergent results might be explained by the fact that the analysis of 
Gonzalez (2013) was made for the specific case of industry downturns where 
“countries with a high level of protection of shareholder rights and a strong system 
of legal enforcement present a negative effect of leverage on corporate operating 
performance” (Gonzalez, 2013, p.182). The study of El-Chaarani (2015) has the 
major problem of focusing only in the year of 2012 which is a small period for this 
type of analysis.  
Finally Tsuruta (2015) studied 90,036 small Japanese firms in the 1996-2006 
period. This study was the only one who got a clear positive relationship between 
debt and a firm’s performance. The analysis of the data allowed reaching three 
different conclusions: first, a firm’s performance (measured by operating income to 
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total assets ratio and sales growth rate) in “highly leveraged firms is higher than in 
lower leveraged firms”; second, highly “leveraged small firms reduce the burden of 
debt and avoid the cost of bankruptcy”; and finally “highly leveraged firms use 
alternative ways of financing like selling bills receivables in order to not increase 
debt” (Tsuruta, 2015, p.408). 
 
2.4. Critical analysis of the literature reviewed 
 
The effects of debt on a firm’s performance have been studied both with 
theoretical approaches and empirical studies. Table 5 shows a summary of the 
fourteen empirical studies reviewed in the previous section showing the diversity of 
results regarding the effects of debt on a firm’s performance. 
 
Table 5: Summary of empirical studies results 
Number of 
Countries  
Positive 
relationship 
Negative 
relationship 
Mixed results Total 
One country 1 3 5 9 
More than one 
country 
0 1 4 5 
Total 1 4 9 14 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
The analysis of these results from the empirical studies reinforces the analysis 
of the theoretical literature by providing divergent results. However, it is interesting 
to see that there is only one study, namely Tsuruta (2015), presenting a clear positive 
relationship between debt and a firm’s performance by studying small firms in Japan. 
In the case of studies focusing on only one country mixed results may result from the 
use of accounting and market measures as proxies for firm performance. Both 
Olokoyo (2013) and Salim and Yadav (2012) reached similar results with a negative 
relationship between debt and a firm’s performance measured by accounting 
measures and a positive relationship in the case of market measures which is in 
agreement with the study of Al-Matari et al. (2014) on the use of performance 
measures and consequent mixed results with use of the two types of performance 
measures.  
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Another important factor to take in consideration are the divergent results 
between the two measures of debt (short term debt and long term debt) and a firm’s 
performance since as shown by Abor (2005) and Abor (2007), among others, the 
effects can be different with a tendency for a positive effect of short term debt on 
firm performance and negative effect of long term debt. 
Also relevant is the fact that most studies focusing on more than one country 
obtained mixed results not reaching a solid conclusion which might indicate the 
effect of the different institutional frameworks in the analysis. It is worth noting that 
most empirical studies reviewed in this study were focused on only one country, 
therefore the different conclusions presented by these studies may result from the 
influence of the institutional framework of the country in analysis. Weill (2008) had 
a different approach with seven European countries and analyzed the impact of the 
different institutional frameworks. Gonzalez (2013) and El-Chaarani (2015) also 
include the institutional framework in their studies but an individual analysis by 
country was not made, instead countries were aggregated in English origin common 
law countries, French origin civil law countries, German origin civil law countries 
and Scandinavian origin civil law countries. The results of these studies also diverge 
between countries and suggest the influence of the institutional factors on the study. 
Zeitun and Saleh (2015) and Abor (2007) also studied more than one country but the 
analysis was not done in order to draw conclusions on the effect of different 
institutional frameworks. 
Finally, some of the reviewed studies also have small samples in the number 
of firms studied. For example, Abor (2005) only studied 22 firms, Ebaid (2009) 64 
firms and Olokoyo (2013) presents a sample of 101 firms. Another important factor 
is the period of the analysis: some studies were focused on small periods which 
might compromise the results. This is the case of two studies that focus on analyzing 
the impact of the institutional framework in the relationship between debt and a 
firm’s performance on European countries: Weill (2008) address the 1998-2000 
period (3 years) and El-Chaarani (2015) only focuses on the year of 2012. 
To sum up the factors mentioned above justify the need for a study focusing 
on the impact of the institutional framework on the relationship between debt and 
firm performance focusing on a solid sample in order to fill this research gap.   
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3. Methodology 
 
In this Chapter it will be discussed the methodology of this study, starting by 
the presentation of the phases of the study (section 3.1) followed by the model 
specification (section 3.2) and finally data sources and characterization of the sample 
are presented (section 3.3). 
 
3.1. Phases of the study 
 
This study aims at studying the effect of institutional framework factors on 
the relationship between debt and a firm’s performance. In this way figure 1 shows 
the different steps to be implemented in order to achieve those objectives. 
 
Figure 1: Phases of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             First, we need to specify the model, defining the variables to be included and 
that can explain the firm's performance. Second, it is necessary to collect data for the 
different variables through different databases and make a brief descriptive analysis 
of the variables of the model. Finally, it is necessary to estimate the model using an 
Data Collection 
AMADEUS Database 
Performance 
measures 
Debt 
measures 
Institutional 
framework indicators 
 
Variables analysis 
Model specification 
Analysis of results 
 
Performance=f(Debt, Institutional factors Index, control variables) 
 
Control 
variables 
Annual freedom of the world reports 
Model estimation 
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appropriate method and to analyse the results in order to answer the research 
question:   “Does the institutional framework affect the relationship between debt 
and a firm’s performance?”. 
 
3.2. Model specification  
 
 Considering the input of the literature review this section presents a model in 
order to test the impact of the institutional factors on the relationship between debt 
and firm performance. In this way, this study assumes that a firm’s performance can 
be affected by debt (the main explanatory variable) and introduces an interactive 
term between institutional factors and debt. Additionally, like most empirical studies, 
we introduce some control variables, such as firm size, growth and age, as well as 
dummies for time, industry and country. In this way, the model to be estimated is: 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑭𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝒊,𝒕 +𝜷𝟑 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕−𝟏+ 𝜷𝟔𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔  
                              +𝜷𝟕𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 + 𝜷𝟖𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 + µ𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  (1) 
 
Where PERFit, the dependent variable, represents the firm performance. 
Regarding the explanatory variables, DEBTi,t-1 represents a debt measure and 
DEBTi,t-1*INSTi,t-1 is an interaction term between debt and the institutional factors. 
Similarly to Gonzalez (2013) this interaction term aims at discovering if the 
country’s legal system influences the effect of debt on a firm´s performance. We also 
introduce three control variables: SIZEi,t-1, GROWTHi,t-1 and AGEi,t-1 representing the 
size of the firm, the growth of sales and the age of the firm, respectively. Following 
the example of Gonzalez (2013) the explanatory variables directly related to the 
company are lagged one year in order to mitigate the problem of simultaneity 
between some variables. Like Gonzalez (2013) and Weill (2008), Dummy variables 
are also used, namely Year Dummies to control for macroeconomic factors, two-digit 
Sector Dummies in order to control for specific effects of each individual sector, and 
Country Dummies in order to control for other specific country effects. Finally µi,t 
represents the error term. 
Following the tendency from the studies reviewed (e.g. Simerly and Li 
(2000); Ebaid (2009); Salim and Yadav (2012); Olokoyo (2013); and Zeitun; Saleh 
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(2015), among others) this analysis will use two alternative performance measures, 
the ratio of net income over assets (ROA) and the ratio of net income over equity 
(ROE), since those are easily accessible and commonly used. As for debt, data 
collection will focus on long term debt and current liabilities in order to cover the 
total duration of debt. In this way three proxies of debt are used: the ratios of long 
term debt, current liabilities and total debt over total assets, similarly to most existing 
studies (e.g. Abor (2005); Abor (2007); Ebaid (2009); Olokoyo (2013); Akem et al. 
(2014); among others). Debt is expected to have ambiguous effects on a firm’s 
performance since as the literature review showed empirical results on this matter are 
inconclusive as well as the theoretical arguments. 
Regarding the institutional framework, we focus on the index of “Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights” (Rights) as well as the index of credit 
market regulation (Credit). These indicators were chosen for their proximity to the 
ones used by Weill (2008) and Gonzalez (2013) and by their availability for the 
period of analysis. The two indexes were obtained from the Economic Freedom of 
the World Report from 2010 to 2015.  
The first index focuses on the “protection of persons and their rightfully 
acquired property as a central element of economic freedom and a civil society” 
(Gwartney, Hall and Lawson, 2010, p.3). This first indicator focus on the “efficiency 
of the legal system” as well as the “protection of rights” for both shareholders and 
creditors, the main ingredients of an “economic freedom legal system are the rule of 
law, security of property rights, an independent judiciary, and an impartial court 
system” (Gwartney et al., 2010, p.5). Following Weill (2008)’s arguments, an 
improvement in the “efficiency of the legal system” increases protection of the rights 
of shareholders and debtholders (creditors), diminishing the role of the “free cash 
flow” argument but also reducing “moral hazard problems” resulting from frictions 
between debtholders and shareholders. Figure 2 synthesizes the channels through 
which the “efficiency of the legal system” affects the relationship between debt and 
performance.  
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Figure 2: Effects of the efficiency of the legal system on the relationship between debt and a 
firm’s performance 
 Efficiency of the legal 
system ↑ 
 
   
Protection of shareholders' 
rights ↑ 
 Protection of creditors' rights ↑ 
   
Weakens the free cash flow 
argument (debt positively affects 
performance) 
 Attenuate moral hazard issues 
(debt negatively affects 
performance) 
 
To sum up, insofar as the “efficiency legal system” affects two mechanisms 
justifying a different type of relationship between debt and performance (positive / 
negative), it is not possible to anticipate its ultimate impact. 
The second index (credit) focuses on “regulatory restraints that limit the 
freedom of exchange in credit, labor, and product markets” (Gwartney et al., 2010, 
p.5). For this index of credit market regulation, we focus on the first component 
(5A), which is divided in four sub-components, reflecting conditions in the domestic 
credit market. These sub-components are “ownership of banks, foreign bank 
competition, private sector credit and interest rate controls”. According to (Gwartney 
et al., 2010, p.6) “The first two sub-components provide evidence on the extent to 
which the banking industry is dominated by private firms and whether foreign banks 
are permitted to compete in the market. The final two sub-components indicate the 
extent to which credit is supplied to the private sector and whether controls on 
interest rates interfere with the market in credit. Countries that use a private banking 
system to allocate credit to private parties and refrain from controlling interest rates 
receive higher ratings for this regulatory component”. An higher rating in this 
regulatory component is associated with higher institutional quality which, according 
to Weill (2008) will have a positive influence on the relationship between debt and a 
firm’s performance. According to Weill (2008) international differences in access to 
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credit result in competitiveness advantages increasing a firm’s performance 
Finally, control variables are also included in the analysis with the input of 
the literature review. The first control variable is firm size which is included in all the 
empirical studies reviewed, excluding Akem et al. (2014). Usually firm size is 
expressed through the logarithm of assets, sales or number of employees. We opt by 
the logarithm of assets since most reviewed studies adopt this measure (e.g. Weill 
(2008); El-Chaarani (2015); Zeitun and Saleh (2015)). It is anticipated an ambiguous 
result on the relationship between a firm’s size and firm performance since there are 
opposite arguments on this matter. On the one hand larger companies tend to exploit 
economies of scale and have better abilities to use technology as well as the ability to 
achieve better product diversification and larger market shares (Majumbar and 
Chhibber, 1999; Weill, 2008; Yazdandar and Ohmar, 2015), which justifies the 
existence of a positive relationship between firm size and performance. On the other 
hand there is another argument that defends a negative relationship between firm size 
and a firm’s performance suggesting that larger firms come under the control of 
managers which are driven by their own goals which can result on the replacement of 
the objective of maximizing the profit function of the firm by the objective of 
maximizing the managers’ utility function (Pervan and Višić, 2012).  
Other commonly used control variables are Growth and firm’s age. Growth is 
usually measured as Growth of Sales, appearing in five reviewed studies (Abor, 
2005; Abor, 2007; Salim and Yadav, 2012; Zeitun and Saleh, 2015 and El-Chaarani, 
2015). This variable is expected to have a positive effect on a firm’s performance 
since growth generates additional income from new investments projects (Zeitun and 
Saleh 2015). Finally, Age is usually measured as the logarithm of the number of 
years since firm inception, appearing in five reviewed studies (Majumbar and 
Chhibber, 1999; Akem et. al, 2014; Yazdanfar and Ohmar, 2015; Tsuruta, 2015 and 
El-Chaarani 2015). We used LOG(AGE+1) since there are firms with 1 year of 
existence. In our model firm Age is expected to have an ambiguous result on firm 
performance. On the one hand a positive effect on firm performance can occur 
through different factors, starting by learning processes and business experience as 
well as getting access to more resources and reputation effects which create 
opportunities for better performance (Majumbar and Chhibber, 1999; Yazdandar and 
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Ohmar, 2015). On the other hand we can expect negative effects, since with aging it 
is normal to occur an increase of organizational rigidities, the rise of costs, margins 
thin, growth slows, obsolescence of assets, and reduction of investment and R&D 
activities (Loderer and Waelchli, 2009). Aging also seems to increase the diffusion of 
rent-seeking behavior since corporate governance worsens and CEO payment goes 
up following the same logic of the negative effects of size on firm’s performance 
(Loderer and Waelchli, 2009). 
The variables of the model, the respective proxies and expected effect on firm 
performance are presented in table 6. 
 
Table 6: Model variables, proxies and expected effects on performance 
Variables Proxies Expected effect on 
performance 
Debt 
Long term debt, current liabilities 
and total debt to total assets ratios 
Positive/Negative 
Institutional factors 
Credit market regulations (Credit) Positive (through debt) 
Legal structure and security of 
property rights (Rights) 
Positive/Negative (through 
debt) 
Size Logarithm of assets Positive/Negative 
Growth Annual sales growth rate Positive 
Age 
Logarithm of the number of years 
since firm inception (+1) 
Positive/Negative 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
3.3. Data sources and characterization of the sample 
 
The present study uses a database of 48,840 firms from nine European 
countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden) for the 2008-2013 period (293,040 firm-year observations). The sample of 
companies with data of performance, debt and control variables was obtained 
through the Amadeus database that includes financial and accounting information for 
more than 20 million European companies from 43 countries. Using this Database 
the research strategy was to start by limiting the firms by Region, namely to Western 
Europe countries. Additionally, our focus was on manufacturing firms with two-digit 
NACE5 code from 10 to 32. The following steps to define the search strategy 
                                                          
5 “Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community”. 
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included defining the status to active companies and excluding micro companies 
from the analysis by limiting the number of employees to a minimum of 10 and the 
turnover to a minimum of 2,000 euros. To finish, the research was limited by 
availability of the different indicators for the 2008-2013 period. This research 
strategy enabled us to reach an initial database of 52,980 companies extracted from 
Amadeus on April 2016. Afterwards we eliminated firms with very high or very low 
values of debt in each year (the top and bottom 1% firms) to account for possible 
outliers. Finally the base was then limited with the exclusion of NACE code 12 and 
19 since these represent the tobacco and petroleum sector, respectively, with a very 
low number of companies (together had only 163 companies). This process enabled 
us to export a final database of 48,840 European companies from nine European 
countries. Table 7 presents the number of companies by country on the database 
collected. 
Table 7: Number of companies by country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
We focus on a relevant group of European countries in order to extend the 
analyses performed by Weill (2008) and El-Chaarani (2015) since both authors 
studied the effect of the institutional framework in the relationship between debt and 
firm performance in European countries but in small periods of time. Weill (2008) 
focuses on six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Norway, Italy, Spain and 
Country (code) Number of 
companies 
% 
Belgium (BE) 1,560 3.2 
Finland (FI) 714 1.5 
France (FR) 3,017 6.2 
Germany (DE) 1,149 2.3 
Greece (GR) 1,284 2.6 
Italy (IT) 27,785 56.9 
Portugal (PT) 2,763 5.7 
Spain (ES) 8,396 17.2 
Sweden (SE) 2,172 4.4 
Total 48,840 100.0 
27  
Portugal) in the 1998-2000 period (3 years) and El-Chaarani (2015) analyses eight 
countries (France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
Ireland) in the year of 2012. We focus on nine countries in a six year period. 
It is interesting to see that more than 50% of our analysis is focused on Italian 
companies, which is a direct result of a wider availability of data for this country in 
this larger period of time. 
Data collection of institutional framework indicators was based on annual 
freedom of the world reports focusing on two specific indicators, namely the 
indicator 2 – “Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights” and 5 – “Regulation 
of Credit, Labor, and Business”: (A) Credit market regulations. Each of these indexes 
has values from zero to ten with higher values representing better legal structure and 
security of property rights and better credit marker regulation, respectively. 
 
3.4. Descriptive analysis of the variables 
 
In order to understand the behaviour of the different variables of the model it 
is important to study their descriptive statistics. In this way table 8 presents the 
descriptive statistics (mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation) for the 
model variables. Table A1 in the appendix also provides the averages by sector. 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. DEV 
ROE (%) 11.54 991.57 -996.35 48.59 
ROA (%) 4.26 99.01 -89.85 8.64 
Total Debt (%) 54.56 159.96 0 21.25 
Long term Debt (%) 9.97 93.47 0 12.83 
Short term Debt (%) 44.59 158.41 0 20.05 
Age 27.00 179.00 0.67 19.92 
Assets (thousand 
euros) 
46,819 324,000,000 48 1,581,821 
Sales Growth (%) 2.58 369.31 -68.06 22.61 
Rights 6.34 8.90 5.30 0.77 
Credit 8.66 10.00 6.00 0.83 
Source: Own elaboration 
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 Following the order of table 8 the first two variables are used as alternative 
proxies for the dependent variable (performance). The variable ROE, defined by the 
ratio of net income over equity, presents high amplitude with a maximum of 
991.57% and a minimum of -996.35%. In comparison ROA has a maximum of 
99.01% and a minimum of -89.85%. Regarding averages by sector (Table A1 in 
appendix) sector 21 (Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations) has the higher average values for both of the 
performance measures (20.83% and 7.9% for the ROE and ROA, respectively) while 
sector 13 (Manufacture of textiles) has the lowest values (4.78% and 2.25%, 
respectively for ROE and ROA) compared to the averages of the all sample of 
11.54% and 4.26%.  
Proceeding with the analysis, the variables of total debt, long term debt and 
short term debt as ratios of total assets are used as proxies of debt. As shown in table 
8 short term debt (mean of 44.59%) represents roughly four times the weight of long 
term debt (mean of 9.97%) and also with greater volatility. These two variables are 
added to each other to reach total debt with a mean of 54.56%. The analysis of Table 
A1 shows that sector 11 (Manufacture of beverages) has at the same time the higher 
value of long term debt and the lowest value of short term debt (13.60% and 
39.31%), while sector 15 (Manufacture of leather and related products) presents the 
highest average value of short term debt (52.82%) and sector 27 (Manufacture of 
electrical equipment) presents the lowest average value for long term debt (7.08%). 
Continuing with the control variables, Age presents an average of 27 years 
since firm inception with a minimum of 0.67 for a company created in 2008 and a 
maximum of 179 years for the oldest company in the analysis. Sector 15 presents the 
lowest average value for Age (about 22 years) and sector 11 presents the highest 
average value (about 39 years). Assets presents a mean of 46,819 thousand euros 
with a great amplitude of results, sector 29 (Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers) presents the highest average value (561,135 thousand euros) and 
sector 15 has the lowest average value (7,767 thousand euros). Finally, the variable 
Growth presents an average of 2.58% with a maximum of 369.01% and a minimum 
of -68.01%. Sector 21 presents the highest average value (6.44%) and sector 23 
(Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products) presents the lowest average 
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value (-1.62%).  
As for the institutional framework indicators of Rights and Credit which are 
valuated from 0 to 10, it is possible to see that the indicator of rights has an average 
of 6.34 with a maximum of 8.9 for Finland and a minimum of 5.3 for Greece. As for 
the indicator of credit regulation the average is 8.66 with a maximum of 10 for 
Sweden and a minimum of 6 to Greece (Graph 4). 
To complement the analysis of the descriptive statistics it is important to 
analyse the evolution of the main variables of the model (performance, debt and 
institutional indexes) over the period under review (2008-2013). In this way graph 1 
provides de evolution of firm’s performance measures. 
 
Graph 1: Evolution of the Performance measures, 2008-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
As it is possible to see on graph 1, performance measures have similar 
behaviour in the period of analysis with a greater volatility of ROE. The path for 
both variables is described by an initial declining path in 2008 and 2009 followed by 
a recovery path until 2010, declining again until 2012 and recovering in 2013. ROE 
has a slightly different path which might be explained by the way it is measured: 
ROE is the ratio of net income over equity while ROA is the ratio of net income over 
assets which lead us to conclude that specially in the year of 2008 there was an 
increase in equity as a result of lower amounts of debt that might be a result of the 
crisis that initiated in that year as it is possible to see in graph 2. 
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Regarding the variables related with debt, graph 2 provides the evolution of 
short term debt and long term debt over the period of analysis. 
 
Graph 2: Evolution of Debt ratios behavior 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
With Graph 2 it is possible to understand the behavior of debt variables in the 
2008-2013 period with a stable path for the two variables. The behavior of the two 
variables are only different in the 2008-2009 period where it is possible to observe a 
small increase in long term debt but a reduction in short term debt. It is important to 
evidence the fact that the companies of this sample are financing their needs mainly 
through short term debt. 
Finally, with regard to the institutional indexes graph 3 presents the evolution 
over the period of analysis. 
 
Graph 3: Evolution of institutional framework indicators behavior 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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The evolution of institutional framework indicators is presented in Graph 3 
where it is possible to see that there is not much variability over the years analyzed, 
especially in the first indicator of legal structure and security of property rights 
(Rights). Nevertheless it is positive to see an improvement in credit market regulation 
(Credit) in the 2009-2013 period which might be a cause of the financial crisis that 
started in 2008 and consequent tightening of financial market rules. 
Finally and because the sample consists of firms from nine different countries 
it is important to analyze the average of the variables by country. Starting with the 
institutional indicators, Graph 4 presents the indexes by country. 
 
Graph 4: The institutional indexes by country 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
By the analysis of graph 4 it is possible to take different conclusions. First the 
countries from the north of Europe have more efficient legal systems since Finland 
has the higher index in both indicators and Sweden the second higher index also in 
both indicators. Second it is possible to see that the lower levels for these indexes are 
concentrated in the countries from the South with Greece having the lowest values in 
both indicators while France, Belgium and Germany stay in the middle with 
intermediate values. 
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Regarding the variables related to the firms Table 9 shows the mean of each 
variable in each different country of this analysis enabling an initial analysis by 
country. 
 
Table 9:  Averages by country 
Country 
ROE 
(%) 
ROA 
(%) 
Long term 
debt (%) 
Short term 
debt (%) 
Total debt 
(%) 
 Assets 
(thousands 
euros) 
Growth 
(%) 
Age 
Belgium 13.68 5.95 8.93 40.96 49.89 104,124 2.60 31.82 
Germany 24.31 8.33 10.05 30.73 40.78 967,270 4.35 47.52 
Spain 5.10 2.92 16.00 36.72 52.72 23,069 0.64 23.57 
Finland 16.07 6.82 17.35 35.52 52.87 85,262 4.34 25.67 
France 11.82 6.45 5.92 43.83 49.75 34,003 3.15 27.31 
Greece 6.30 2.81 10.71 39.86 50.57 22,914 -0.51 83.28 
Italy 13.54 4.14 7.01 49.07 56.08 17,460 2.76 24.32 
Portugal 5.63 2.73 20.38 41.47 61.85 10,899 3.95 24.59 
Sweden 11.29 6.55 14.69 38.45 53.14 51,096 5.41 30.04 
Global 
average 
11.54 4.26 9.97 44.59 
54.56 
46,818 2.58 27.00 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Through table 9 is possible to take some relevant information for this 
analysis. Starting by an analysis of performance it is clear that companies in 
Germany have, on average, higher values in terms of ROE and ROA, the two proxies 
of firm’s performance, as well as for the value of Assets used as proxy of firm size, 
and the lowest value for the total debt ratio. It is interesting to see that Portugal has 
the lowest average values for ROA and Assets and the second lowest for ROE while 
having the highest value for total debt. Another relevant factor is that Greece, 
presenting the oldest companies, on average, in this analysis is the only country 
presenting negative growth as well as presenting the lowest values for the variables 
of the institutional framework as referred to above. 
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4. Results 
 
The present chapter presents and discusses the results of the study. It starts 
with the presentation of a correlation analysis (section 4.1), the presentation of an 
econometrical analysis by country (section 4.2) followed by the estimation of the 
model and analysis of results in section (4.3). 
 
4.1. Correlation analysis 
 
Before proceeding to the model estimation it is important to understand the 
correlations between the variables of the model. The corresponding correlation 
matrix is presented in Table 10 
 
Table 10: Correlation matrix 
Variables ROE ROA 
Long 
Term 
Debt 
Short 
Term 
Debt 
Total 
Debt 
LOG 
(Assets) 
Growth 
LOG 
(Age+1) 
ROE 
1.000    
 
  
 
ROA 
0.574 
0.000 1.000   
 
  
 
Long term 
Debt 
-0.097 
0.000 
-0.182 
0.000 1.000 
 
 
  
 
Short term 
Debt 
0.064 
0.000 
-0.123 
0.000 
-0.223 
0.000 1.000 
 
  
 
Total 
Debt 
0.002 
0.279 
-0.225 
0.000 
0.393 
0.000 
0.808 
0.000 
 
1.000   
 
LOG(Assets) 
-0.027 
0.000 
0.029 
0.000 
-0.011 
0.000 
-0.119 
0.000 
-0.119 
0.000 1.000 
 
 
Growth 
0.188 
0.000 
0.225 
0.000 
-0.001 
0.695 
0.128 
0.000 
0.120 
0.000 
0.015 
0.000 1.000 
 
LOG(Age+1) 
-0.084 
0.000 
-0.051 
0.000 
-0.052 
0.000 
-0.223 
0.000 
-0.243 
0.000 
0.302 
0.000 
-0.075 
0.000 
 
1.000 
Source: Own elaboration 
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The analysis of the correlation matrix enables us to see that there are no high 
values of correlation between the independent variables that would cause problems in 
the model estimation. In fact, the higher value (0.808) is between short term debt and 
total debt which are alternative proxies for debt. All other correlation coefficients 
between independent variables are smaller than 0.4. 
 
4.2. Analysis by country 
 
This section starts with the presentation of a synthesis of results of the 
regressions by country (see table 11) and the respective analysis of the results of the 
estimation of the model. Since we are using panel data, according to Wooldridge 
(2001) two different methods of estimation can be used: fixed effects and random 
effects. However, since we are using sector dummies that remain constant for each 
firm over time, the fixed effects model is not suitable. In this way we use the random 
effects GLS regression method.6 All continuous variables were standardized 
similarly to Gonzalez (2013). For each country we estimate six models since we have 
two alternative measures of performance and three alternative measures of debt. 
These regressions enable an initial analysis in order to study the impact of debt on 
firm’s performance in each individual country. The regressions are shown in tables 
A2 to A6 in the appendix. A summary of the results is provided by table 11. 
 
Table 11: Summary of the results of the estimations by country 
Country Belgium Germany Spain Finland France 
Variables ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Long term debt - 0 - 0 - - - 0 - - 
Short term debt + + 0 + + 0 + + 0 0 
Total debt 0 + - + - - 0 + - 0 
Size=log(assets) - - - - + + - - - 0 
Growth + + + + + + + + + + 
Age=log(age+1) 0 0 0 0 - - - 0 - - 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
                                                          
6 All estimations were made using STATA. 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
Country Greece Italy Portugal Sweden 
Variables ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Long term debt - - - - - - - - 
Short term debt + + - + 0 0 + 0 
Total debt 0 0 - + - - - 0 
Size=log(assets) - - - - + 0 0 0 
Growth + + + + + + + + 
Age=log(age+1) 0 0 - - - - 0 0 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legend: 0: non-significant relationship; +: positive relationship; -: negative relationship 
Source: Own elaboration 
Looking at table 11 it is possible to take some initial conclusions. First and 
regarding the measures of debt it is possible to conclude that for most countries long 
term debt has a negative impact on firm’s performance independently of the 
performance measure used, while being not statistically significant in the case of 
ROE for Germany, Belgium and Finland. As for short term debt it seems to have a 
positive impact on performance with the exception of the cases of Italy, Portugal and 
France. In Italy short term debt presents a negative effect on ROA but positive on 
ROE and the results for short term debt in Portugal and France are non-significant. 
These divergent results between short term debt and long term debt are in line with 
some of the conclusions of the literature, namely Abor (2005) and Abor (2007) who 
reported similar results. When talking about total debt the results are inconclusive 
with different results in each country which are dependent of the combined effects of 
short term debt and long term debt. 
The analysis of the control variables also allowed some conclusions. First the 
variable growth presents a positive effect on ROA and ROE for the nine countries 
under analysis which is in line with expectations. As for assets (a proxy of firm size) 
and age the results confirm the ambiguous results already expected from the 
theoretical point of view:7 age presents a negative effect in 5 countries but has a 
positive impact in Germany while being non-significant in 3 countries. Assets 
presents a negative effect on a firm’s performance for most countries but it has a 
                                                          
7 Note that there are theoretical arguments supporting both positive and negative effects of size 
and age on a firm’s performance. 
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positive effect in Portugal and Spain and it has non-significant effects on Sweden 
firm’s performance.  
Since we obtained different results by country, in particular as regards the 
total debt, this may be a result of the institutional framework of each country. In 
order to deepen this analysis section 4.3 will estimate the model with the addition of 
country dummies and interaction terms between debt and the institutional framework 
indicators. 
 
4.3. The role of institutional factors 
 
This section presents the estimation of the model given by equation (1). We 
start by estimating the model without considering the interactive term between debt 
and the institutional framework indicators and then we proceed to the estimation of 
the model introducing the interactive term. Results of the estimation are in table 12 
and table 13, respectively. 
Table 12: Results of the model estimation (whole sample) 
Variables ROA ROE 
Long term debt 
-0.062*** 
(0.003)   
-0.036*** 
(0.003) 
  
Short term debt 
 
0.009*** 
(0.003)   
0.062*** 
(0.004) 
 
Total debt 
  
-0.045*** 
(0.003)  
 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
Size=log(assets) 
-0.033*** 
(0.004) 
-0.038*** 
(0.004) 
-0.036*** 
(0.004) 
-0.043*** 
(0.003) 
-0.042*** 
(0.003) 
-0.044*** 
(0.003) 
Growth 
0.098*** 
(0.002) 
0.098*** 
(0.002) 
0.102*** 
(0.002) 
0.078*** 
(0.002) 
0.073*** 
(0.002) 
0.076*** 
(0.002) 
Age=Log(age+1) 
-0.038*** 
(0.004) 
-0.031*** 
(0.004) 
-0.044*** 
(0.004) 
-0.059*** 
(0.004) 
-0.044*** 
(0.004) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 244,200 244,200 244,200 244,200 244,200 244.200 
R2 0.076 0.060 0.077 0.034 0.034 0.031 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all 
independent variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own elaboration  
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   The model estimation in table 12 reinforces the conclusions from the 
analysis of the regressions by country in section 4.2: negative effect of long term 
debt on ROA and ROE, positive effects of short term debt on ROA and ROE and 
divergent results for total debt (a negative impact on ROA and positive impact on 
ROE). As for the control variables, growth presents, as expected, a positive impact 
on a firm’s performance and age presents a negative impact as well as firm size. As 
expected, Growth presents a positive relationship with performance. Zeitun and 
Saleh (2015) highlight that sales growth can be seen as a proxy for growth 
opportunities and a firm with higher growth opportunities tends to have higher 
performance. For its part, the variables size and age have a negative relationship with 
performance. In the case of size, the negative sign of the coefficient supports the idea 
shared by the managerial theories of the firm that a firm may have other objectives 
than profit maximization, such as the utility maximization of managers when 
corporate ownership and firm’s management is different (Pervan and Višić, 2012). 
With respect to the variable age, the negative relationship with performance supports 
the idea that with the aging of the firm tends to occur an increase of organizational 
rigidities, the equipment becomes obsolete, which causes increased costs and reduced 
margins (Loderer and Waelchli, 2009). 
            For the final estimation, presented in table 13, we created two dummies 
(Dcredit and Drights) for the institutional framework indicator of credit and rights in 
order to create the interactive term between these indicators and debt similarly to 
Gonzalez (2013). The dummies are defined as follows: Drights=1 if the variable 
Rights is above average and Drights=0 otherwise; as for Dcredit the same logic is 
applied (Dcredit=1 if the variable Credit is above average and Dcredit=0 otherwise). 
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Table 13: Model estimation with interactive term between debt and institutional indicators 
Variables ROA ROE 
Long term debt 
-0.069*** 
(0.004)   
-0.037*** 
(0.006) 
  
Short term debt 
 
-0.033*** 
(0.004)   
0.072*** 
(0.005) 
 
Total debt 
  
-0.080*** 
(0.004)  
 
0.051*** 
(0.005) 
Size=log(assets) 
-0.032*** 
(0.004) 
-0.038*** 
(0.004) 
-0.035*** 
(0.004) 
-0.043*** 
(0.003) 
-0.042*** 
(0.003) 
-0.046*** 
(0.003) 
Growth 
0.098*** 
(0.002) 
0.099*** 
(0.002) 
0.103*** 
(0.002) 
0.078*** 
(0.002) 
0.073*** 
(0.002) 
0.076*** 
(0.002) 
Age=Log(age+1) 
-0.038*** 
(0.004) 
-0.035*** 
(0.004) 
-0.047*** 
(0.004) 
-0.059*** 
(0.004) 
-0.043*** 
(0.004) 
-0.048*** 
(0.004) 
Long term 
debt*Drights 
0.017*** 
(0.005)   
-0.002 
(0.006) 
  Long term 
debt*Dcredit 
-0.004 
(0.003)   
0.003 
(0.005) 
  Short term 
debt*Drights  
0.075*** 
(0.007)   
-0.040*** 
(0.008) 
 Short term 
debt*Dcredit  
0.021*** 
(0.003)   
0.008 
(0.005) 
 
Total debt*Drights 
  
0.056*** 
(0.007)  
 
-0.059*** 
(0.007) 
Total debt*Dcredit 
  
0.020*** 
(0.003)  
 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 244,200 244,200 244,200 244,200 244,200 244,200 
R2 0.076 0.062 0.077 0.034 0.034 0.032 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration  
 
Table 13 presents the complete estimation of the model with the inclusion of 
interactive terms between the three alternative measures of debt and the two 
dummies for the institutional framework. It is important to emphasize that with the 
inclusion of interactive terms the results of the control variables remain largely 
unchanged: they have the same sign presenting only slight changes in the value of 
the coefficients.  
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Regarding debt measures, with the inclusion of these interactive terms the 
coefficients of the variables long term debt and total debt also maintained the 
respective signal; there was only a change in the effect of short term debt that now 
presents a negative effect on ROA and positive effect on ROE.  
The analysis of the coefficients of the interactive terms allows us to take 
some conclusions on the effect of the institutional framework on the relationship 
between debt and firm’s performance. These variables capture the differential effect 
of the debt variable on a firm’s performance in countries with above average values 
for the institutional framework indexes (compared to this effect in countries with 
below average values). With respect to the interactive term of the variable debt and 
the dummy Dcredit the result obtained was either not statistically significant (when 
using long term debt) or positive and statistically significant (when resorting to short 
term and total debt as proxies for debt). This result suggests that the favourable effect 
of debt on a firm’s performance is more relevant in countries with credit market 
regulation above average which means that a better credit market regulation is indeed 
improving competitiveness and firm performance as said by Weill (2008). This result 
is similar to that of Weill (2008) who obtained positive results for the impact of 
access to bank credit in the relationship between debt and a firm’s. 
As for the interactive term of the variable debt and the dummy Drights (the 
indicator of “efficiency of the legal system” and protection of rights) we found 
contradictory results depending on the performance measure used: regardless of the 
proxy used for debt, the coefficient of the interactive term is positive and statistically 
significant when performance is measured by return on assets (ROA) while a 
negative coefficient was obtained when using ROE. The positive effect obtained 
when using ROA suggests a higher relevance of the “free cash flow” argument 
compared with moral hazard problems arising from the conflict between creditors 
and shareholders in countries characterized by higher “efficiency of the legal 
system”. However, the negative effect obtained when resorting to ROE suggests the 
opposite. In this way it is difficult to draw conclusions on the differential impact of 
debt on a firm’s performance in countries with above average values for the indicator 
of “efficiency of the legal system”. Note that Gonzalez (2013) concluded that when 
the “protection of property rights” is higher and the “system of legal enforcement” is 
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robust, the effect of debt on firm operating performance when industry faces crisis is 
negative. According to the author this means that when the institutional quality is 
high, the costs of financial distress play a more important role than the disciplinarian 
role of debt. As for Weill (2008), the author concluded by a positive impact of the 
efficiency of the legal system with no significant results for the protection of both 
shareholder and creditor rights. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The effect of debt on a firm’s performance is a relevant theme to managers 
for a long time. As we have mentioned previously this subject has already been 
studied from different theoretical perspectives (e.g. the agency cost theory or the 
trade-off theory, among others) as well as numerous empirical studies. Both the 
theoretical perspectives and the empirical studies reach divergent results with regard 
to the impact of debt on a firm’s performance. 
Weill (2008) reports that empirical studies usually focus only on one country 
and suggests that the different results evidenced in the empirical literature may derive 
from the influence of the institutional framework on the relationship. This 
perspective was also shared by Gonzalez (2013) and El-Chaarani (2015) but the three 
authors used small samples which created a research gap that this study explores. In 
this way the objective of this study was to answer the following research question: 
Does the institutional framework affect the relationship between debt and a firm’s 
performance? 
In order to answer the research question we focused on a sample of 48,840 
firms from nine European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) over the 2008-2013 period.  
 The results of the model estimation using a random effects model show that 
the institutional framework is indeed affecting the relationship between debt and firm 
performance specially when measured by the indicator of credit market regulation. 
The results of the estimation suggest that the beneficial effect of debt on a firm’s 
performance is more substantial in countries with credit regulation above average.                          
As for the indicator of Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights the results are 
different depending on the performance measure used, not allowing a solid 
conclusion to this study. The differential effects of debt on a firm’s performance in 
countries with an above average Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights is 
positive when measured by ROA but negative when measured by ROE. These 
opposite effects suggest the need for more research, particularly in order to 
understand to what extent the use of different performance measures causes either a 
different impact of debt on a firm’s performance or a different effect of institutional 
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indicators in the relationship between debt and performance.  
Furthermore it seems relevant to enhance the divergent results on the effects 
of debt on firm’s performance by the division between long term debt and short term 
debt, similarly to Abor (2005) and Abor (2007) among others. As referred to above, 
long term debt seems to be the major cause of a negative relationship between the 
variables of debt and a firm’s performance since none of the regressions of this study 
showed positive results for this variable. As for short term debt it appears to be 
related with a positive impact on a firm’s performance. These facts might open the 
path for another studies focusing on explaining the divergent results of debt on firm’s 
performance by focusing in this division of short term and long term debt. 
Despite the consistency of this study the results still have some limitations, 
namely the availability of institutional framework indicators, as a major focus of this 
study, for the period of analysis which could improve the results of the estimation by 
focusing on different aspects of the institutional framework of each country. Another 
limitation is the number of firms by country, which as a results of the research 
strategy, is not well balanced. Italian companies represent half of the sample which 
might be important to take into consideration. 
 Future research should focus on eliminating the limitations of this study by 
focusing in more complete and balanced databases and including more institutional 
framework indicators which should be available for larger periods of time in the 
future. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variables average by sector 
 
Nace2 ROE 
(%) 
ROA 
(%) 
Long 
term debt 
(%) 
Short term 
Debt (%) 
Assets 
(thousand 
euros) 
Growth 
(%) 
Age Number 
of firms 
% 
10 10.09 4.01 13.08 44.21 26,556 5.31 29.96 5,354 10.96 
11 7.27 3.37 13.60 39.31 54,385 4.16 38.74 795 1.63 
13 4.78 2.25 9.79 43.04 10,980 1.86 29.21 2,019 4.13 
14 13.27 4.17 8.77 48.35 19,945 1.96 24.99 1,563 3.20 
15 19.10 5.10 7.47 52.82 7,767 6.02 21.88 1,504 3.08 
16 7.03 2.78 11.99 43.44 11,867 -0.04 25.54 1,740 3.56 
17 9.59 3.61 10.36 44.66 55,757 3.10 29.44 1,338 2.74 
18 8.58 3.24 12.74 41.80 8,227 0.09 27.16 1,646 3.37 
20 13.29 5.46 9.00 43.22 94,452 3.85 31.02 2,202 4.51 
21 20.83 7.90 8.65 39.52 415,448 6.44 37.74 520 1.06 
22 10.85 4.23 10.57 44.08 29,022 2.82 27.27 3,175 6.50 
23 5.33 2.36 11.14 39.89 48,109 -1.62 29.57 2,529 5.18 
24 6.53 3.34 9.87 43.70 93,086 1.44 30.77 1,255 2.57 
25 13.14 4.50 9.83 44.96 10,053 2.34 23.97 9,641 19.74 
26 15.86 6.00 7.11 44.17 109,821 3.92 23.90 1,455 2.98 
27 16.73 5.77 7.08 45.90 26,812 1.97 26.63 1,891 3.87 
28 15.35 5.34 7.87 46.75 27,935 3.25 26.13 5,588 11.44 
29 6.94 3.86 9.22 45.14 561,135 1.64 26.85 1,111 2.27 
30 14.71 5.41 9.51 45.08 113,123 3.61 25.17 417 0.85 
31 5.61 2.36 10.69 46.18 9,028 -0.34 24.08 1,793 3.67 
32 13.98 5.24 8.76 42.05 17,203 2.09 26.22 1,304 2.67 
Global 
Mean 
11.54 4.26 9.97 44.59 
46,818 2.58 27 
- - 
Legend: Nace 2 code: 10- Manufacture of food products; 11- Manufacture of beverages; 13- Manufacture 
of textiles; 14- Manufacture of wearing apparel; 15- Manufacture of leather and related products; 16- 
Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork;except furniture;manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials; 17- Manufacture of paper and paper products; 18- Printing of reproduction of recorded 
media; 20- Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; 21- Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical 
products and pharmaceutical preparations; 22- Manufacture of rubber and plastic products; 23- 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products; 24- Manufacture of basic metals; 25- Manufacture of 
fabricated metal products,except machinery and equipment; 26- Manufacture of computer,electronic and 
optical products; 27- Manufacture of electrical equipment; 28- Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
n.e.c.; 29- Manufacture of motor vehicles,trailers and semi-trailers; 30- Manufacture of other transport 
equipment; 31- Manufacture of furniture; 32- Other manufacturing; 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table A2: Belgium estimation 
 Variables 
Performance measure: ROA 
 
Performance measure: ROE 
 
Long term debt 
-0.082*** 
(0.014)   
-0,011 
(0.016) 
  
Short term 
debt  
0.046* 
(0.024)   
0.070*** 
(0.026) 
 
Total debt 
  
-0.021 
(0.022)  
 
0.054** 
(0.024) 
Size=log(asset
s) 
-0.127 *** 
(0.023) 
-0.147*** 
(0.023) 
-0.149*** 
(0.026) 
-0.053*** 
(0.020) 
-0.048*** 
(0.018) 
-0.059*** 
(0.020) 
Growth 
0.107*** 
(0.011) 
0.104*** 
(0.011) 
0.109*** 
(0.011) 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.047*** 
(0.009) 
0.049*** 
(0.009) 
Age=log( 
age+1) 
-0.005 
(0.025) 
0.013 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.021) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7.800 7.800 7.800 7.800 7.800 7.800 
𝑅2 0.056 0.036 0.0459 0.0237 0.0314 0.0280 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Table A3: Germany estimation  
 Variables Performance measure: ROA Performance measure: ROE 
Long term 
debt 
-0.052** 
(0.020) 
  
-0.056 
(0.038)   
Short term 
debt 
  
-0.008 
(0.031) 
  
0.165*** 
(0.053)  
Total debt    
-0.066** 
(0.030) 
 
 
0.119*** 
(0.041) 
Size=log(ass
ets) 
-0.188*** 
(0.033) 
-0.200*** 
(0.033) 
-0.193*** 
(0.033) 
-0.073*** 
(0.027) 
-0.072*** 
(0.027) 
-0.087*** 
(0.027) 
Growth 
0.137*** 
(0.017) 
0.138*** 
(0.017) 
0.140*** 
(0.017) 
0.106*** 
(0.019) 
0.099*** 
(0.019) 
0.101*** 
(0,019) 
Age=log( 
age+1) 
0.036 
(0.023) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.030 
(0.024) 
0.022 
(0.027) 
0.035 
(0.026) 
0.031 
(0.026) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5.745 5.745 5.745 5.745 5.745 5.745 
𝑅2 0.066 0.057 0.067 0.035 0.051 0.037 
Legend:*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table A4: Spain estimation 
 Variables 
Performance measure: ROA 
 
Performance measure: ROE 
 
Long term debt 
-0.053*** 
(0.005) 
  
-0.030*** 
(0.005) 
  
Short term debt  
0.049*** 
(0.008) 
  
0.008 
(0.007)  
Total debt   
-0.016** 
(0.008) 
 
 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
Size=log(assets) 
0.073*** 
(0.009) 
0.072*** 
(0.009) 
0.074*** 
(0.009) 
0.037*** 
(0.005) 
0.039*** 
(0.005) 
0.038*** 
(0.005) 
Growth 
0.099*** 
(0.005) 
0.094*** 
(0.005) 
0.100*** 
(0.005) 
0.068*** 
(0.004) 
0.066*** 
(0.004) 
0.069*** 
(0.004) 
Age=log( age+1) 
-0.093*** 
(0.009) 
-0.071*** 
(0.010) 
-0.082*** 
(0.010) 
-0.058*** 
(0.006) 
-0.048*** 
(0.006) 
-0.056*** 
(0.006) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41.980 41.980 41.980 41.980 41.980 41.980 
𝑅2 0.085 0.064 0.075 0.038 0.032 0.035 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Table A5: Finland estimation 
 Variables Performance measure: ROA Performance measure: ROE 
Long term debt 
-0.076*** 
(0.020) 
  
-0.020 
(0.023) 
  
Short term debt  
0.090** 
(0.041) 
  
0.159*** 
(0.054) 
 
Total debt   
-0.023 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.085*** 
(0.031) 
Size=log(assets) 
-0.084*** 
(0.031) 
-0.063** 
(0.031) 
-0.071** 
(0.032) 
-0.044** 
(0.020) 
-0.029 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
Growth 
0.136*** 
(0.020) 
0.131*** 
(0.020) 
0.139*** 
(0.020) 
0.080*** 
(0.016) 
0.069*** 
(0.016) 
0.076*** 
(0.016) 
Age=log( age+1) 
-0.066** 
(0.030) 
-0.052* 
(0.031) 
-0.063** 
(0.031) 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
-0.017 
(0.023) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3.570 3.570 3.570 3.570 3.570 3.570 
𝑅2 0.081 0.063 0.071 0.032 0.041 0.031 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table A6: France estimation 
 Variables 
Performance measure: ROA 
 
Performance measure: ROE 
 
Long term debt 
-0.092*** 
(0.017) 
  
-0.045*** 
(0.016)   
Short term debt  
0.022 
(0.018) 
  
0.007 
(0.015)  
Total debt   
-0.038** 
(0.019) 
 
 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
Size=log(assets) 
-0.069*** 
(0.018) 
-0.073*** 
(0.018) 
-0.072*** 
(0.018) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
Growth 
0.140*** 
(0.012) 
0.138*** 
(0.012) 
0.141*** 
(0.013) 
0.082*** 
(0.009) 
0.080*** 
(0.009) 
0.082*** 
(0.009) 
Age=log( age+1) 
-0.085*** 
(0.022) 
-0.075*** 
(0.022) 
-0.084*** 
(0.022) 
-0.047*** 
(0.012) 
-0.043*** 
(0.012) 
-0.046*** 
(0.013) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15.085 15.085 15.085 15.085 15.085 15.085 
𝑅2 0.050 0.040 0.049 0.029 0.025 0.027 
 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration  
 
Table A7: Greece estimation 
 Variables Performance measure: ROA Performance measure: ROE 
Long term debt 
-0.052*** 
(0.013) 
  
-0.026** 
(0.013) 
  
Short term debt  
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
  
0.041** 
(0.016)  
Total debt   
0.012 
(0.018) 
 
 
0.023 
(0.015) 
Size=log(assets) 
-0.084*** 
(0.026) 
-0.101*** 
(0.025) 
-0.103*** 
(0.026) 
-0.052*** 
(0.016) 
-0.060*** 
(0.016) 
-0.065*** 
(0.018) 
Growth 
0.112*** 
(0.012 
0.110*** 
(0.012) 
0.112*** 
(0.012) 
0.064*** 
(0.009) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.063*** 
(0.008) 
Age=log( age+1) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6.420 6.420 6.420 6.420 6.420 6.420 
𝑅2 0.102 0.086 0.086 0.072 0.074 0.066 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table A8: Italy estimation 
 Variables 
Performance measure: ROA 
 
Performance measure: ROE 
 
Long term debt 
-0.065*** 
(0.003) 
  
-0.033*** 
(0.005) 
  
Short term debt  
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
  
0.069*** 
(0.005)  
Total debt   
-0.058*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.050*** 
(0.004) 
Size=log(assets) 
-0.049*** 
(0.006) 
-0.061*** 
(0.006) 
-0.055*** 
(0.005) 
-0.083*** 
(0.005) 
-0.082*** 
(0.005) 
-0.088*** 
(0.005) 
Growth 
0.088*** 
(0.002) 
0.090*** 
(0.002) 
0.093*** 
(0.002) 
0.083*** 
(0.003) 
0.077*** 
(0.003) 
0.079*** 
(0.003) 
Age=log( age+1) 
-0.036*** 
(0.005) 
-0.037*** 
(0.005) 
-0.050*** 
(0.005) 
-0.081*** 
(0.005) 
-0.062*** 
(0.005) 
-0.066*** 
(0.005) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 138.925 138.925 138.925 138.925 138.925 138.925 
𝑅2 0.063 0.054 0.075 0.036 0.037 0.036 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration  
 
Table A9: Portugal estimation 
 Variables Performance measure: ROA Performance measure: ROE 
Long term debt 
-0.048*** 
(0.007) 
 
  
-0.037*** 
(0.007) 
  
Short term debt  
0.010 
(0.010) 
  
0.013 
(0.009) 
 
Total debt   
-0.075*** 
(0.015) 
 
 
-0.038*** 
(0.011) 
Size=log(assets) 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.032* 
(0.016) 
0.032** 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
Growth 
0.084*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.085*** 
(0.007) 
0.090*** 
(0.007) 
0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.069*** 
(0.010) 
0.074*** 
(0.009) 
Age=log( age+1) 
-0.081*** 
(0.012) 
-0.073*** 
(0.013) 
-0.092*** 
(0.013) 
-0.065*** 
(0.008) 
-0.059*** 
(0.008) 
-0.069*** 
(0.008) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13.815 13.815 13.815 13.815 13.815 13.815 
𝑅2 0.085 0.068 0.094 0.040 0.034 0.038 
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table A10: Sweden estimation 
 Variables Performance measure: ROA Performance measure: ROE 
Long term debt 
-0.096*** 
(0.014)   
-0.033** 
(0.015) 
  
Short term debt 
 
0.080*** 
(0.25)   
0.042 
(0.034) 
 
Total debt 
  
-0.045** 
(0.021)  
 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
Size=log(assets) 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
0.000 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.027) 
Growth 
0.121*** 
(0.011) 
0.118*** 
(0.011) 
0.125*** 
(0.011) 
0.083*** 
(0.010) 
0.081*** 
(0.011) 
0.083*** 
(0.011) 
Age=log( age+1) 
-0.031 
(0.023) 
-0.020 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       
Observations 10.860 10.860 10.860 10.860 10.860 10.860       
𝑅2 0.076 0.050 0.065 0.029 0.026 0.026       
Legend:*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; all continuous variables are standardized; all independent 
variables are lagged 1 year; robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration  
 
